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Introduction
Abigail Ross, a sophomore at Tulsa University, reported to school
officials in 2014 that Patrick Swilling Jr., one of the school’s basketball
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players, raped her.1 In the course of the school’s investigation of her
complaint, Ross learned that years earlier, Tulsa University Campus
Police (“TUCP”) officers fielded a pair of complaints that Swilling had
raped another student.2 The earlier victim maintained that she told the
officers that she had been raped, but the director of the police
department, later claiming that she denied ever being raped, chose not
to document the report or alert the administration.3
During Swilling’s disciplinary hearing, the school refused to allow
Ms. Ross to make any mention of the earlier rape report—or the two
rape reports that surfaced during the investigation—and applied
“strained reasoning” to conclude that Swilling had probably not raped
Ross.4 Ross dropped out of classes in the spring semester and never returned to Tulsa University after the school issued its report.5
Ross filed a complaint alleging that the university had violated
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 19726 through its deliberate
indifference to the 2012 rape report and her report.7 The U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma granted the university’s
motion for summary judgment on those claims,8 and the Tenth Circuit
affirmed, holding that the school could not be held liable because no
one had notified an “appropriate person,” i.e., an official “with
authority to take corrective action,”9 that Swilling’s presence posed a
risk to the campus community.10
While the District Court had found three different bases for
concluding that the campus security officers who fielded the 2012 report
were appropriate persons,11 the Tenth Circuit disagreed, holding that
none of those reasons were adequate: First, although TUCP was
supposed to initiate the school’s “corrective action” process when it
received a report of sexual assault, the Tenth Circuit said this was
1.

Ross v. Univ. of Tulsa, 180 F. Supp. 3d 951, 954 (N.D. Okla. 2016), aff’d,
859 F.3d 1280 (10th Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed, No. 17-969, 2018 WL
333856 (U.S. Jan. 4, 2018).

2.

Id. at 957–59.

3.

Id. at 958.

4.

Id. at 961, 973.

5.

Id. at 963.

6.

20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2012).

7.

Complaint and Jury Demand at ¶ 44, Ross v. Univ. of Tulsa, 180 F. Supp.
3d 951 (No. 4:14–cv–00484-TCK-PJC), 2014 WL 4087919.

8.

Ross, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 978.

9.

Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998).

10.

Ross, 859 F.3d at 1288–92.

11.

Ross, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 966.
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inadequate because the officers were required to pass the report on to
someone who could take corrective action—not to take corrective action
themselves;12 Second, although TUCP consists of officers from the Tulsa
Police Department and its own armed 13 investigators with arrest
authority,14 the Tenth Circuit concluded that “[i]t is not clear” how a
police investigation into rape allegations could constitute corrective
action, stating that “[p]erhaps investigation is a form of corrective
action; perhaps not. The answer is not self-evident . . . .”;15 Finally,
the District Court concluded that letting the university tell students
that TUCP would institute corrective action and then letting TUCP
neglect that obligation would allow the university to “effectively shield
itself from Title IX civil liability.”16 The Tenth Circuit rejected this
rationale, as well; even if university policy tasked TUCP with beginning
corrective measures, it had not “expressly” labeled TUCP or its director
as an “appropriate person[].”17
The court held that employees who are merely cogs in the wheel of
the Title IX reporting process, who “cannot themselves take corrective
action” cannot be deemed appropriate persons.18 It did not say what
kinds of corrective action must be within an appropriate person’s power,
but one hypothetical implied that the power would lie with “a Dean of
Students who is tasked with adjudicating student-conduct complaints.”19
Ross’s petition for certiorari is now pending before the U.S.
Supreme Court. 20 The petition echoes the District Court’s opinion,
providing that the Tenth Circuit’s holding “effectively creates a
framework for schools and universities to insulate themselves from Title
IX liability” 21 and asking the Court to review the Tenth Circuit’s

12.

Ross, 859 F.3d at 1289–90.

13.

Campus Security, Univ. Tulsa, https://utulsa.edu/offices/campus-security/
[https://perma.cc/LAN6-A4MT] (last visited Feb. 25, 2018).

14.

Campus Safety Measures, Univ. Tulsa, https://utulsa.edu/offices/campussecurity/campus-safety-measures/ [https://perma.cc/HC2F-LJG2] (last
visited Feb. 13, 2018).

15.

Ross, 859 F.3d at 1291.

16.

Ross, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 967.

17.

Ross, 859 F.3d at 1291–92.

18.

Id. at 1290.

19.

Id.

20.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ross v. Univ. of Tulsa, No. 17-969, 2018 WL
333856 (U.S. Jan. 4, 2018).

21.

Id. at 12.
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application of the “appropriate person” test first announced in Gebser
v. Lago Vista Independent School District.22
The Court should grant the petition, but not on the questions
presented. This Comment argues instead that both the District Court
and the Tenth Circuit erred in applying the appropriate-person test at
all.
Part I analyzes Gebser and Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education, 23 the landmark cases giving rise to the private cause of
action under Title IX for sexual harassment, and the differing
approaches the Court took in laying out the elements of those claims
in cases involving teacher-harassers and student-harassers.
Part II discusses the development of the case law in the circuit
courts since Davis and the extent to which courts have treated Davis
either as a mere extension of Gebser or as establishing an independent
test for liability in peer-harassment cases.
Part III argues that the Supreme Court should intervene to clarify
the law in this area. Such a decision would at once resolve the split
among circuits, bolster the public policy embodied in Title IX, and address the inequitable consequences for students who attend schools that
lure them into reliance on a robust Title IX process that, in fact, does
not exist.
Part IV lays out the problems with applying the appropriate-person
test to peer-harassment cases, using a collegiate athletic coach as a case
study.
Finally, Part V proposes that the Court clarify the proper approach
for peer-harassment cases either by explicitly disclaiming the
applicability of the appropriate-person test or by establishing a
presumption that school employees are appropriate persons.

I. Gebser and Davis
The “appropriate person” requirement was born as part of the
Supreme Court’s actual-notice test in Gebser. In that case, a mother
brought a Title IX hostile-environment claim against the school district
after discovering that her daughter was involved in a sexual relationship
with one of her teachers.24 A district court granted summary judgment
for the school district, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
agency principles were not appropriate for determining whether an

22.

524 U.S. 274 (1998); see Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 20, at i
(citing Gebser, 524 U.S. 274 (1998)).

23.

526 U.S. 629 (1999).

24.

Gebser, 524 U.S. at 278–79.
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employee’s harassment of a student should subject a school to a private
cause of action for monetary damages under Title IX.25
The school district received reports that the teacher had made sex
jokes in class, but the Court held that that was insufficient to put it on
notice that the teacher was also having sex with a student.26 Instead,
holding a district liable would require proof that an appropriate
person—“an official who at a minimum has authority to address the
alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the
recipient’s behalf”—knew of the threat to students and responded with
deliberate indifference that effectively permitted the harassment to
continue and deprive the plaintiff of the benefit of her education. 27
Because the report of sex jokes said nothing about the possibility of a
sexual relationship, the Court affirmed summary judgment, but it left
unaddressed the question of whether the school principal who took
those reports was an appropriate person.
Less than a year later, the Court in Davis said that harassment by
a student, rather than a teacher, could also give rise to the implied
private cause of action permitted in Gebser.28 Davis involved a student
whose classmate was permitted to continue groping her and harassing
other students despite their repeated complaints to teachers and the
principal. A district court dismissed the case, saying that peer
harassment could not support a Title IX claim, but the Supreme Court
re-versed, holding that deliberate indifference to harassment by peers
could just as well support a Title IX claim.29
But its decision made no mention of the “appropriate person” test.
Had it intended to apply that test to such cases, the circumstances of
the case suggest that it would have done so; the omission came despite
the fact that the lower courts had never applied the test or offered even
a conclusory statement that an appropriate person knew of the
harassment, despite the fact that the highest-ranking employee with
notice was again a school principal, whose appropriateness the Court

25.

Id. at 283, 292; see also Davis, 526 U.S. at 643 (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at
283) (“[I]n Gebser we expressly rejected the use of agency principles in the
Title IX context . . . .”).

26.

Gebser, 524 U.S. at 291.

27.

Id. at 290.

28.

Davis, 526 U.S. at 643.

29.

Id. (“We consider here whether the misconduct identified in Gebser—
deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment—amounts to an
intentional violation of Title IX, capable of supporting a private damages
action, when the harasser is a student rather than a teacher. We conclude
that . . . it does.”).
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had not directly addressed in Gebser, and despite the fact that at least
one amicus had raised the issue.30
Instead, the Davis Court’s discussion of the Gebser framework
repeatedly emphasized that the appropriate-person analysis was a test
to be applied to cases of misconduct by employees:
“[W]e rejected the use of agency principles to impute liability to
the district for the misconduct of its teachers.”31
“[T]he district could be liable for damages only where the district
itself intentionally acted in clear violation of Title IX by
remaining deliberately indifferent to acts of teacher-student
harassment . . . .”32
“The high standard imposed in Gebser sought to eliminate any
‘risk that the recipient would be liable in damages not for its own
official decision but instead for its employees’ independent
actions.’”33
“Gebser thus established that a recipient intentionally violates
Title IX, and is subject to a private damages action, where the
recipient is deliberately indifferent to known acts of teacherstudent discrimination.”34
“The fact that it was a teacher who engaged in harassment
in . . . Gebser is relevant.”35

The Court reiterated Gebser’s rejection of agency principles and its
requirement of actual notice, but it saw no need to trifle over the precise
scope of authority conferred on whomever a student reports peer
harassment to. Instead, it recognized schools’ broad authority to
regulate the conduct of their students—established through common
law and Court precedent—as the basis for a different standard in cases
of student-on-student harassment.36 In those cases, it said, schools can

30.

Brief of Amici Curiae National School Boards Association et al. in Support
of Respondent, Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (No. 97843), 1998 WL 847120, at *19.

31.

Davis, 526 U.S. at 642 (emphasis added) (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283).

32.

Id. (emphasis added) (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290).

33.

Id. at 643 (emphasis added) (quoting Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290–91).

34.

Id. (emphasis added).

35.

Id. at 653.

36.

Id. at 646 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 507 (1969); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.9 (1985); Davis
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be held liable for subjecting students to harassment “where the recipient
is deliberately indifferent to known acts of student-on-student sexual
harassment and the harasser is under the school’s disciplinary
authority.”37 The Court did not explicitly hold that the appropriateperson test does not apply to student-on-student harassment cases, but
its approach effectively acknowledged that when the offending party is
a student, virtually any employee can be presumed to have authority
to take some corrective action.
The Court made no mention of an appropriate-person requirement
in its only subsequent student-on-student harassment case.38

II. Post-Davis Case Law
For the most part, the circuit courts have followed the Court’s lead.
Of the thirteen circuit courts, only two—the Tenth and the Eleventh—
have ever applied the appropriate-person test to a case of peer
harassment, whether in the Title IX context or in Title VI or
Rehabilitation Act cases, which often follow a parallel analysis.39 The
distinction between the Gebser and Davis tests is plain enough that the
courts have rarely even remarked on it, let alone struggled to apply it.
A. The Majority Rule: Appropriate-Person Analysis Is Inapplicable to
Peer-Harassment Claims

The experience in the Sixth Circuit is generally representative of
those in other circuits. The court has never imposed an appropriateperson requirement in any of its student-on-student harassment cases.
It did briefly acknowledge, in Vance v. Spencer Community Public
School District,40 a difference between the tests for cases of harassment
by teachers and by students, but it did not go so far as to explicitly
delineate those differences. In Vance, a student won a jury verdict in a
Title IX claim alleging that teachers and principals ignored her complaints about harassment from other students over the course of several
v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1193 (11th Cir. 1996);
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 152 (Am. Law Inst. 1965)).
37.

Davis, 526 U.S. at 647.

38.

See Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (2009).

39.

Davis, 526 U.S. at 643; Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274,
283 (1998). The author’s review of peer-harassment cases published on
Westlaw that cite Davis and include the phrase “appropriate person”
revealed no cases published in the remaining eleven circuit courts.

40.

Vance v. Spencer Cty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 264 (6th Cir. 2000)
(“We find that the slight nuances between the Davis standard and the jury
instructions [including the appropriate-person test] were neither confusing,
misleading, nor prejudicial.”).
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years.41 The court of appeals affirmed the judgment, holding that Davis
required evidence of only three facts, all of which Vance had satisfied:
(1) harassment so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it
can be said to deprive the victims of access to the educational
opportunities or benefits provided by the school; (2) actual knowledge
of the harassment; and (3) deliberate indifference to the harassment.
The court said the actual-knowledge requirement had been satisfied by
com-plaints to a teacher and principal, without any inquiry into what
authority either person possessed to take corrective measures to end the
discrimination.42
The Sixth Circuit acknowledged a wrinkle in the District Court’s
jury instructions, which had told jurors that before they could find deliberate indifference on the part of the school district, “the plaintiff
must prove that . . . the appropriate person decided to act or not to
act in spite of that knowledge [of danger to the plaintiff].”43 While the
Sixth Circuit said such instructions “differ from the standard the
Supreme Court announced in Davis,” the school district had not
disputed its knowledge of the harassment, and the court found that the
instructions “were neither confusing, misleading, nor prejudicial.”44 The
court did not explicitly disclaim the appropriate-person test, but it has
never applied it in any of the dozen peer-harassment cases it has decided
since Davis.45
Because there is little explanation from these decisions as to why
they are spending so little time—if any at all—on a question that
frequently disposes of cases involving employee harassers, we can infer
that they are making the distinction between the two types of cases.
41.

Id. at 256.

42.

Id. at 259 (“In this case, it is undisputed that Spencer had actual knowledge.
Both Alma and her mother made repeated reports to Spencer. Alma
informed both her teachers and principals.”).

43.

Id. at 263−64.

44.

Id. at 264.

45.

M.D. ex rel. Deweese v. Bowling Green Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 17-5248, 2017
WL 4461055 (6th Cir. Oct. 6, 2017); Tumminello v. Father Ryan High Sch.,
Inc., 678 F. App’x 281 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 121 (2017);
Stiles ex rel. D.S. v. Grainger Cty., Tenn., 819 F.3d 834, 848 (6th Cir. 2016);
Shively v. Green Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 579 F. App’x 348 (6th Cir.
2014) (mentioning the “authority to take corrective action” requirement
without actually applying it); Pahssen v. Merrill Cmty. Sch. Dist., 668 F.3d
356 (6th Cir. 2012); Williams v. Port Huron Sch. Dist., 455 F. App’x 612
(6th Cir. 2012); Patterson v. Hudson Area Sch., 551 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2009);
S.S. v. E. Ky. Univ., 532 F.3d 445 (6th Cir. 2008); Winzer v. Sch. Dist. for
City of Pontiac, 105 F. App’x 679 (6th Cir. 2004); Wayne v. Shadowen, 15
F. App’x. 271 (6th Cir. 2001); Vance, 231 F.3d at 264; Soper v. Hoben, 195
F.3d 845 (6th Cir. 1999).
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Among the lower courts, though, there appears to be more
confusion. In the Northern and Southern Districts of Ohio, for instance,
there has been an “appropriate person” inquiry in a few peerharassment cases. 46 In none of those cases, though, was the test a
substantial barrier; the court either gave the question no real treatment,
or it deemed actual knowledge of teachers and principals sufficient to
move the case forward. Several other courts around the Sixth Circuit
have gone deeper into the appropriate-person analysis in peerharassment cases, with mixed results.47

46.

Fulton v. W. Brown Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:15-CV-53, 2016
WL 6893845, at *1, *7 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 23, 2016) (applying the appropriateperson test in a Title VI context); Galloway v. Chesapeake Union Exempted
Vill. Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:11-CV-850, 2012 WL 5268946, at *1, *8–9
(S.D. Ohio Oct. 23, 2012) (mentioning but not applying the appropriateperson requirement); Logan v. Sycamore Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:09CV-00885, 2012 WL 2011037, at *1, *5 (S.D. Ohio June 5, 2012) (finding
material factual dispute as to whether principal and teacher were appropriate
persons); Evans v. Bd. of Educ. Sw. City Sch. Dist., No. 2:08-CV-794, 2010
WL 2889100, at *1, *8 (S.D. Ohio July 20, 2010), aff’d in part, 425 F. App’x
432, 439 (6th Cir. 2011) (mentioning but not applying the appropriateperson test); Schroeder ex rel. Schroeder v. Maumee Bd. of Educ., 296 F.
Supp. 2d 869, 880 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (“Title IX imposes liability when ‘an
official who at a minimum has authority to address the alleged discrimination
and to institute corrective measures on the recipient’s behalf has actual
knowledge of discrimination in the recipient’s programs and fails to
respond.’”) (quoting Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274,
276 (1998)). But see Vidovic v. Mentor City Sch. Dist., 921 F. Supp. 2d 775
(N.D. Ohio 2013) (failing to inquire whether a guidance counselor was
appropriate person); Shively v. Green Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No.
5:11CV2398, 2013 WL 774643 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 2013), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part and remanded, 579 F. App’x 348 (6th Cir. 2014) (making no inquiry
into who received the complaints).

47.

See, e.g., M.D. v. Bowling Green Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 1:15-CV-00014-GNSHBB, 2017 WL 390280, at *6 n.2 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 27, 2017), aff’d sub nom.
M.D. ex rel. Deweese v. Bowling Green Indep. Sch. Dist., 709 Fed. Appx.
775, 779 (6th Cir. 2017) (finding that a principal is an appropriate person);
Hill v. Blount Cty. Bd. of Educ., 203 F. Supp. 3d 871, 883 (E.D. Tenn. 2016)
(assuming that an assistant principal is an appropriate person); Patterson v.
Hudson Area Sch., No. 05-74439, 2007 WL 4201137, *6 (E.D. Mich. Nov.
27, 2007) rev’d and remanded, 551 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2009) (imposing the
appropriate-person requirement but not applying it); Lopez v. Metro. Gov’t
of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 646 F. Supp. 2d 891, 916 (M.D. Tenn. 2009)
(finding bus drivers, teachers, and custodians are not appropriate persons);
Staehling v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., No. 3:07-0797, 2008
WL 4279839, *10 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 12, 2008) (finding that a bus driver is
not an appropriate person); Peer ex rel. Doe v. Porterfield, No. 1:05-CV-769,
2007 WL 9655728, *9 n.5 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 8, 2007) (finding a school
secretary is not an appropriate person).
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These circumstances are mimicked throughout most of the country.
In the First, 48 Second, 49 Third, 50 Fourth, 51 Fifth, 52 Seventh, 53 Eighth 54
and Ninth55 Circuits, none of the peer-harassment cases citing Davis
have ever required a plaintiff to prove actual notice by an appropriate
48.

Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504 F.3d 165 (1st Cir. 2007), rev’d
and remanded, 555 U.S. 246 (2009); Porto v. Town of Tewksbury, 488 F.3d
67 (1st Cir. 2007).

49.

KF ex rel. CF v. Monroe Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist., 531 F. App’x 132 (2d
Cir. 2013); Zeno v. Pine Plains Cent. Sch. Dist., 702 F.3d 655 (2d Cir. 2012);
DiStiso v. Cook, 691 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2012); R.S. v. Bd. of Educ. of
Hastings-On-Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 371 F. App’x 231 (2d Cir. 2010);
DT v. Somers Cent. Sch. Dist., 348 F. App’x 697 (2d Cir. 2009); Doe v. E.
Haven Bd. of Educ., 200 F. App’x 46 (2d Cir. 2006); Gant ex rel. Gant v.
Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 195 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 1999).

50.

L. L. v. Evesham Twp. Bd. of Educ., 710 F App’x 545 (3d Cir. 2017); Yan
Yan v. Penn State Univ., 529 F. App’x 167 (3d Cir. 2013); Whitfield v. Notre
Dame Middle Sch., 412 F. App’x 517 (3d Cir. 2011); DeJohn v. Temple
Univ., 537 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2008); Doe v. Bellefonte Area Sch. Dist., 106 F.
App’x 798 (3d Cir. 2004); Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200
(3d Cir. 2001).

51.

S.B. ex rel. A.L. v. Bd. of Educ. of Harford Cty., 819 F.3d 69 (4th Cir. 2016);
Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Prince George’s Cty., 605 F. App’x 159 (4th Cir.
2015); M.D. v. Sch. Bd. of City of Richmond, 560 F. App’x 199 (4th Cir.
2014); Rouse v. Duke Univ., 535 F. App’x 289 (4th Cir. 2013); Stevenson ex
rel. Stevenson v. Martin Cty. Bd. of Educ., 3 F. App’x 25 (4th Cir. 2001).

52.

Plummer v. Univ. of Houston, 860 F.3d 767 (5th Cir. June 23, 2017, revised
June 26, 2017); K. S. v. Nw. Indep. Sch. Dist., 689 F. App’x 780 (5th Cir.
2017); Fennell v. Marion Indep. Sch. Dist., 804 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2015);
Kelly v. Allen Indep. Sch. Dist., 602 F. App’x 949 (5th Cir. 2015); Estate of
Lance v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 982 (5th Cir. 2014);
Carmichael v. Galbraith, 574 F. App’x 286 (5th Cir. 2014); Sanches v.
Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 647 F.3d 156 (5th Cir. 2011);
Watkins v. La Marque Indep. Sch. Dist., 308 F. App’x 781 (5th Cir. 2009);
Bruce v. Wigley, 273 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2001).

53.

Doe v. Galster, 768 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2014); Davis v. Carmel Clay Sch., 570
F. App’x 602 (7th Cir. 2014); Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chi. Heights, Ill.
Sch. Dist. 163, 315 F.3d 817 (7th Cir. 2003); Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch.
Dist., 282 F.3d 946 (7th Cir. 2002); Adusumilli v. Ill. Inst. of Tech., 191 F.3d
455 (7th Cir. 1999).

54.

Estate of Barnwell v. Watson, 880 F.3d 998 (8th Cir. 2018); K.T. v. CulverStockton Coll., 865 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2017); Roe v. St. Louis Univ., 746
F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2014); Wolfe v. Fayetteville, Arkansas Sch. Dist., 648
F.3d 860 (8th Cir. 2011); Ostrander v. Duggan, 341 F.3d 745 (8th Cir. 2003).

55.

Al-Rifai v. Willows Unified Sch. Dist., 469 F. App’x 647 (9th Cir. 2012); Doe
v. Univ. of Pac., 467 F. App’x 685 (9th Cir. 2012); M.L. v. Fed. Way Sch.
Dist., 394 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2005); Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist.,
324 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2003); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208
F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2000).
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person, though some lower courts have spontaneously grafted that
requirement into their peer-harassment analyses.56
B. The Minority Rule: Liability for Peer Harassment Requires Notice to
an Appropriate Person

The situation is different in the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits.
Neither one uniformly conducts an appropriate-person analysis, but
both have applied it in some cases, including a few where it has barred
recovery. In addition to the Ross decision discussed above, the Tenth
Circuit reversed a decision holding that a victim of peer harassment
56.

E.M. ex rel. J.M. v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., No. A-17-CA-387 LY, 2018
WL 627391, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2018) (“[A] counselor is not an
‘appropriate person’ for notice purposes under Title IX.”); D.V. ex rel. B.V.
v. Pennsauken Sch. Dist., 247 F. Supp. 3d 464, 475 (D.N.J. 2017) (“Nor is
there evidence that the psychiatrist supervised or disciplined school
personnel such that she was an ‘appropriate person’ who could subject the
District to liability.”); Bittenbender ex rel. S.B. v. Bangor Area Sch. Dist.,
No. CV 15-6465, 2017 WL 1150642, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2017) (“[T]he
plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded that an appropriate person was informed of
the sexual harassment.”); Doe 1 v. Baylor Univ., 240 F. Supp. 3d 646, 659
(W.D. Tex. 2017), motion to certify appeal denied, No. 6:16-CV-173-RP,
2017 WL 1628994 (W.D. Tex. May 1, 2017) (“[T]he Court finds it plausible
that personnel at [the campus police department and counseling
center] . . . were ‘appropriate persons’ pursuant to Title IX.”); Krebs v.
New Kensington-Arnold Sch. Dist., No. CV 16-610, 2016 WL 6820402, at *3
(W.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2016) (“The Krebs must plead . . . that [Plaintiffs]
provided actual notice to “an appropriate person” who had authority to take
corrective measures.”); Swanger v. Warrior Run Sch. Dist., 137 F.Supp. 3d
737, 751 (M.D. Pa. 2015), vacated and remanded, 659 F. App’x 120 (3d Cir.
2016) (“[A] plaintiff seeking recovery for a Title IX violation predicated on
student-on-student sexual harassment must establish . . . [that] an
‘appropriate person’ had actual knowledge of the alleged discrimination or
harassment.”); Tyrrell v. Seaford Union Free Sch. Dist., No. CV-084811(SJF)(MLO), 2010 WL 1257793, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2010), report
and recommendation adopted, No. CV-08-4811(SJF)(MLO), 2010 WL
1198055 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2010) (“[To establish] a violation of Title IX
based on student-on-student harassment . . . an ‘appropriate person’ must
have ‘actual knowledge’ of the alleged discrimination or harassment.”);
McGrath v. Dominican Coll. of Blauvelt, N.Y., 672 F.Supp. 2d 477, 486
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[P]laintiff may recover for student on student harassment,
if the plaintiff can demonstrate four elements . . . an appropriate person
has actual knowledge of the discrimination or harassment.”); T.Z. v. City of
New York, 634 F. Supp. 2d 263, 268 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[A]n appropriate
person must have ‘actual knowledge’ of the alleged discrimination or
harassment.”); Herndon v. Coll. of Mainland, No. G-06-0286, 2009 WL
367500, at *14 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2009) (“To recover damages for an
instructor’s sexual harassment of a student or for a student’s sexual
harassment of another student, the plaintiff must show that 1) an
‘appropriate person,’ i.e., an official or employee of the funding recipient with
authority to take corrective action to end the discrimination; 2) had actual
notice.”).
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had failed to state a claim for relief, noting that it was bound to accept
as true the complaint’s allegations that teachers had “the authority to
halt Mr. Doe’s known sexually assaultive behavior” and were therefore
appropriate persons to receive a report. 57 But that court has also
decided several other peer-harassment cases in which it never inquired
in-to whether an appropriate person was aware of harassment.58
There is a similar split in authority in the Eleventh Circuit, which
became the first to explicitly acknowledge the possible tension between
the Davis and Gebser standards, noting that Davis “did not directly
address who must have notice.”59 The court stated:
With respect to harassment by teachers or staff, application of
the Supreme Court’s requirement of actual notice to an official
with authority to address the discrimination and to institute
corrective measures results in a limited and readily identifiable
number of school administrators. However, a much broader
number of administrators and employees could conceivably
exercise at least some control over student behavior.60

Because the parties had not fully briefed the issue, the court instead
rested the case on its finding that the harassment in question “was not
so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it had the systemic
effect of denying the girls equal access to education.”61 While the court
indicated it was saving the “appropriate person” question for another
day, it has never revisited it, nor has any other circuit. Since then, the

57.

Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 186 F.3d 1238, 1248 (10th Cir.
1999).

58.

Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist., 511 F.3d 1114 (10th
Cir. 2008); Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir.
2007); Bryant v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-38 of Garvin Cty., OK, 334 F.3d
928 (10th Cir. 2003).

59.

Hawkins v. Sarasota Cty. Sch. Bd., 322 F.3d 1279, 1287 (11th Cir. 2003).

60.

Id.

61.

Id. at 1288.
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court has simply assumed—without explaining why—either that a peerharassment case requires proof of such notice62 or that it does not.63
Neither the D.C. Circuit nor the Federal Circuit has applied Gebser
or Davis to a case of peer harassment.

III. The Shortcomings of Current Title IX
Interpretations
Most obvious among the reasons for the Court to grant certiorari
in Ross is the circuit split that it crystallized. If it was not previously
clear whether or how the Tenth Circuit intended to apply Gebser to
cases of peer harassment, Ross makes plain that the Tenth Circuit is
now willing to bar claims on a basis that only one other circuit has
endorsed. Since before the court was constituted, resolving such
geography-based discrepancies in how the courts treat otherwise
similarly situated plaintiffs has been recognized as one of the primary
justifications for a supreme court. 64 Beyond the consequences for
national unity and uniformity, circuit splits such as this one impose
additional hardships on the legal system by encouraging additional
litigation, in-creasing compliance costs for entities operating in multiple
jurisdictions, and undermining the perceived legitimacy of the law and
judiciary.65

62.

Doe v. Bibb Cty. Sch. Dist., 688 F. App’x 791, 795 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he
plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) the defendant is a Title IX funding
recipient; (2) an ‘appropriate person’ had actual knowledge of the
discrimination . . . .”); Hill v. Cundiff, 797 F.3d 948, 970 (11th Cir. 2015)
(“The second element requires Doe to prove an ‘appropriate person’ capable
of putting the Board on notice had ‘actual knowledge’ of CJC’s sexual
harassment and discrimination.”); Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys.
of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282, 1294 (11th Cir. 2007) (“In the absence of any
allegations that an appropriate person with the Board of Regents had actual
knowledge of the acts that Williams alleges constitute discrimination,
Williams’s Title IX claim against the Board of Regents cannot survive a
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”).

63.

Porter v. Duval Cty. Sch. Bd., 406 F. App’x 460 (11th Cir. 2010); Shotz v.
City of Plantation, Fla., 344 F.3d 1161 (11th Cir. 2003).

64.

The Federalist No. 80, at 475 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1966) (“Thirteen independent courts of final jurisdiction over the same
causes, arising upon the same laws, is a hydra in government, from which
nothing but contradiction and confusion can proceed.”).

65.

See generally Deborah Beim and Kelly Rader, Evolution of Conflict in the
Courts of Appeals (May 12, 2015), https://cpb-us-west-2-juc1ugur1qwq
qqo4.stackpathdns.com/campuspress.yale.edu/dist/6/356/files/2011/10/Bei
m_Rader_Conflicts-xxkfk0.pdf [https://perma.cc/WM6U-3BKU] (exploring
the “life cycle” of an intercircuit split by analyzing an original dataset that
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In this last respect the problem may be the most significant. The
fact that cases are turning on whether women have successfully divined
the “appropriate person” to whom they should report being raped, attacked, or harassed, rather than whether that person took appropriate
measures to remedy the situation, suggests that the system is not
working as Congress intended when it enacted Title IX in recognition
that sexual harassment “is reprehensible and undermines the basic
purposes of the educational system.” 66 If one accepts the Court’s
conclusion that Congress was contemplating an implied cause of
action,67 it is hard to imagine that such an action was supposed to be
available only to those who could navigate educational institutions’
often-byzantine hierarchies to determine which person, or group of
persons, had adequate authority “to address the alleged discrimination
and to institute corrective measures . . . .”68
A. Title IX Is Not Achieving Its Goals Under the Court’s Current
Interpretations

The inadequacy of an interpretation that imposes such
requirements only becomes clearer in light of the recent explosion of
empirical and anecdotal evidence that sexual harassment is far more
pervasive than generally acknowledged, and that it remains obscured
in large part because of the often-insurmountable practical barriers to
reporting it in a way that that will actually lead to meaningful changes.
Thanks in large part to the #MeToo movement, the public and
press are growing more attuned to the problem, as well as to the failures
to seriously address it, especially in cases where harassers have some
level of prestige at the institutions where they prey on their victims.
The case of Larry Nassar—a member of Michigan State University’s
medical faculty who sexually assaulted students and other girls
numbering in the hundreds—has led to the resignation of the school’s
president69 and athletic director, 70 as well as the entire board of the

comprises a sample of conflicts between Courts of Appeals that existed
between 2005 and 2013).
66.

Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 292 (1998).

67.

Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979) (“Title IX presents the
atypical situation in which all of the circumstances that the Court has
previously identified as supportive of an implied remedy are present.”).

68.

Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290.

69.

Julie Mack, Michigan State President Lou Anna Simon Resigns, Mlive
(Jan. 24, 2018), http://www.mlive.com/news/index.ssf/2018/01/lou_anna_
k_simon_michigan_stat.html [https://perma.cc/9YA7-93X7].

70.

Kyle Austin, Michigan State Athletic Director Mark Hollis Resigns Amid
Larry Nassar Fallout, MLive (Jan. 26, 2018), http://www.mlive.com/
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national gymnastics governing board.71 At the University of Arizona, a
track and field coach was fired after police picked him up on charges of
assaulting and stalking one of his players after she accused him of
attacking her with a box cutter in his office.72 Most infamously, the
scandal at Penn State ended the careers of the university’s president,
vice president, athletic director and football coach, all of whom
participated in the cover-up of dozens of rapes perpetrated by assistant
coach Jerry Sandusky.73
Given the abuse of trust involved, these stories of faculty and staff
members preying on students are often more shocking, but they can
obscure the more common problem of sexual harassment and assault
perpetrated against students by their fellow students. Research on the
problem consistently shows that huge numbers of students are the
victims of sexual harassment and assault, and that students are far
more likely than faculty or staff to be the aggressor. The best available
data suggests that roughly 20 percent74 to 30 percent75 of women are
sexually assaulted during their time in college. The share of women who
report being sexually harassed at school jumps to about two-thirds in

spartans/index.ssf/2018/01/michigan_state_athletic_direct_12.html [https:
//perma.cc/6Z8J-5DZX].
71.

Matt Stevens, Remaining Members of U.S.A. Gymnastics Board to Resign
After Nassar Scandal, N.Y. Times (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/01/26/sports/usa-gymnastics-board-nassar.html [https:
//perma.cc/N6MG-Y7EW].

72.

Caitlin Schmidt, ‘20/20’ to Air Special Tonight on Arizona Wildcats Coach
Accused of Assault, Ariz. Daily Star (Nov. 10, 2017), http://tucson.
com/news/local/to-air-special-tonight-on-arizona-wildcats-coach-accused-of/
article_7b567f6c-c624-11e7-b873-23887ccd16bd.html [https://perma.cc/N9A
U-NJCU].

73.

Carter Walker, Jurors Deadlocked in Spanier Trial; Deliberations Continue
Friday, Morning Call (Mar. 23, 2017, 10:06 PM), http://www.mcall.
com/news/breaking/mc-penn-state-abuse-trial-defense-0323-20170323-story.
html [https://perma.cc/9ZR7-KMZN].

74.

Nick Anderson & Scott Clement, 1 in 5 College Women Say They Were
Violated, Wash. Post (June 12, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
sf/local/2015/06/12/1-in-5-women-say-they-were-violated/ [https://perma.
cc/Y8QE-32MG]; Christopher P. Krebs et al., The Campus Sexual
Assault Study 5-2 (2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/
221153.pdf [https://perma.cc/AQJ5-L2EF].

75.

David Cantor et al., Report on the AAU Campus Climate Survey
on Sexual Assault and Sexual Misconduct 148 (2015), http://
www.upenn.edu/ir/surveys/AAU/Report%20and%20Tables%20on%20AAU
%20Campus%20Climate%20Survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HGN-YGZM].
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college,76 and 56 percent in grades 7–12.77 As frequent as harassment is,
though, it is almost exclusively perpetrated by peers, rather than school
employees. Research on college harassment found that only 7 percent
of harassed students were targeted by a professor, with an additional
“small number” targeted by some other school employee.78 In grades 7–
12, the number of harassed students targeted by teachers or other
employees drops to less than 1 percent.79
As common as this problem is, it is obvious that there remain major
barriers to eliminating it. Even with substantial majorities of women
acknowledging in confidential surveys that they have been victims,
numbers from individual schools suggest that sexual harassment and
assault only happens somewhere else. While about one in four women
reports being sexually assaulted in college, 91 percent of colleges reported that there were zero rape reports—substantiated or otherwise—
anywhere on their campuses in 2014. 80 The numbers are not much
better in lower grades: with half of all students in grades 7–12 reporting
that they have personally been victims of sexual harassment, more than
two-thirds of public school systems reported that they fielded exactly
zero reports of sexual harassment or bullying in 2014.81
Some portion of that discrepancy is undoubtedly attributable to
incidents that go unreported, but with research indicating that about 7
percent of harassed college students 82 and 9 percent of harassed
76.

Catherine Hill & Elena Silva, Drawing the Line: Sexual
Harassment on Campus 18 (2005), https://www.aauw.org/files/2013/
02/drawing-the-line-sexual-harassment-on-campus.pdf [https://perma.cc/B
XC2-FPVC]; Harassment on College Campuses, Hollaback, https://
www.ihollaback.org/harassment-on-college-campuses/ [https://perma.cc/8J
D5-FFGJ] (last visited March 28, 2018).

77.

Catherine Hill & Holly Kearl, Crossing the Line: Sexual
Harassment at School 11 (2011), https://www.aauw.org/files/2013/
02/Crossing-the-Line-Sexual-Harassment-at-School.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Q7ZX-WKGX].

78.

Hill & Silva, supra note 76, at 21.

79.

Poom Nukulkij, Knowledge Networks Project Report 37 (2011),
https://www.aauw.org/files/2013/02/crossing-the-line-harassment-at-schoolsurvey-methodology.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KEX-BCQE].

80.

Amy Becker, 91 Percent of Colleges Reported Zero Incidents of Rape in
2014, AAUW (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.aauw.org/article/clery-actdata-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/LWC3-KFSG].

81.

Erin Prangley, Two-Thirds of Public Schools Reported Zero Incidents of
Sexual Harassment in 2013–14, AAUW (July 12, 2016), https://www.
aauw.org/article/schools-report-zero-sexual-harassment/ [https://perma.cc/
4Y7M-4QRB].

82.

Hill & Silva, supra note 76, at 32.
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students in grades 7–12 83 do tell some school employee, the schools
them-selves apparently are not reporting all the incidents that their
students report to them. Less clear is how much of that gap is due to
failures in recordkeeping and how much is due to a deliberate effort to
paint a rosier picture of campus life.
In either case, victims can hardly be blamed for being less than
enthusiastic about reporting. When recovering from often-humiliating
psychological and physical attacks, it seems unlikely that anyone would
be in any rush to enlist the aid of a bureaucracy that is either unable
or unwilling to both admit and address the problem. The research bears
this out, with harassed students saying that they do not report
harassment to their schools because they believe that their reports are
not serious enough for the school to take action, that reporting will not
change anything, and that staff members may react negatively toward
them. 84 A separate review of records from the Department of
Education’s Office of Civil Rights, which is responsible for enforcing
Title IX, reached similar conclusions, finding that actual and perceived
failures to take sexual harassment seriously were a recurring theme
among noncompliant schools, with schools tacitly and sometimes
explicitly discouraging victims from triggering investigations.85
Title IX and its accompanying regulations were supposed to address
this problem, in part by requiring schools to “designate at least one
employee to coordinate its efforts to comply with and carry out its
responsibilities under this part, including any investigation of any complaint . . . alleging any actions which would be prohibited by this
part.”86 Even though schools are required to “notify all [their] students
and employees of the name, office address and telephone number of the
employee or employees appointed pursuant to this paragraph,”87 this
information is not getting through to the students who are being
harassed. Nearly half of all college students surveyed did not know
whether their schools had any such person, and nearly three-quarters
of college students who filed harassment reports could not say whether
the person they talked to was their school’s Title IX coordinator.88
83.

Hill & Keale, supra note 77, at 2.

84.

Id. at 27; Hill & Silva, supra note 76, at 33.

85.

Lenore Schaffer nee Malone, Understanding Noncompliance: A Qualitative
Content Analysis of Title IX Sexual Misconduct Violations Using the Office
for Civil Rights Investigative Findings 92–104 (May 2017) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern Mississippi), http://aquila.usm.
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2414&context=dissertations [https://perma.
cc/8G9R-DVQ6].

86.

34 C.F.R. § 106.8(a).

87.

Id.

88.

Hill & Silva, supra note 76, at 35.
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Facing these numbers, it is hard to see how the Tenth Circuit, or
any other court can purport to advance the purposes of Title IX by
imposing highly technical requirements on students who have been
thrust into an already-complex and often overtly hostile system at the
most vulnerable time in their lives. The Supreme Court needs to step
in to correct this error.
B. The Inequitable Results of the Appropriate-Person Test

Even if the Court were to impose an appropriate-person
requirement in peer-harassment cases, it should—at a bare minimum—
hold that a school has actual notice when a student reports harassment
to someone the school itself has assured students will take corrective
action.
In a footnote to Massey v. Akron City Board of Education,89 one
judge remarked that besides actual notice to an appropriate person, the
Gebser standard is also satisfied “when notice is given to any employee
whom the school has designated to respond to harassment complaints.” 90 Although that conclusion may seem at first blush
inconsistent with Gebser, it has slowly spread across the country, with
courts recognizing the inequity inherent in the alternative, which would
permit schools to shield themselves from liability by holding out the
promise of corrective action without ever actually following through on
those promises.91
This was the basic premise of the District Court’s appropriate-person analysis in Ross, which the Tenth Circuit reversed without addressing, and it has been picked up in a variety of other decisions, as
well. Most recent was Wilborn v. South Union State Community
College,92 where the only woman at a truck-driving school brought a
Title IX claim based on her experience in a program that initially
rejected her because she belonged “at home making babies instead of
trying to drive a truck.”93 She reported discrimination and harassment
to the program manager in accordance with the school’s grievance
policy; the program manager was in turn required to pass on the report
to someone who could initiate corrective measures. Despite the school’s
claims that the director had no actual authority to discipline the

89.

82 F. Supp. 2d 735 (N.D. Ohio 2000).

90.

Massey, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 744 n.7.

91.

Yog v. Tex. S. Univ., No. H-08-3034, 2010 WL 4053706, at *4 (S.D. Tex.
Oct. 14, 2010) (citing Massey, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 744 n.7); Doe v. Farmer,
No. 3:06-0202, 2009 WL 3768906, at *8 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 9, 2009).

92.

720 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (M.D. Ala. 2010).

93.

Id. at 1287 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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offending employees, the court held that the school could not require
students to use a sham reporting procedure.94
The logic of that approach seems to have broad appeal and has
been endorsed in several other decisions.95

IV. Why Appropriate-Person Analysis Doesn’t Work
The Tenth Circuit’s hyper-fastidious inquiry into the precise
boundaries of a police force’s authority—facts likely subject to judicial
notice in most cases—highlights the potential for the appropriateperson test to undermine the public policy embodied in Title IX.
Strictly enforcing the appropriate-person test may be justifiable in
the context of harassment by teachers or other staff; a subordinate who
knows that someone in his chain of command is harassing students is
not empowered to separate the two or impose any discipline on the
offender—though he is obviously able to report to someone who is. The
good news for the victims of peer harassment is that—unlike in cases
involving employees, who are more likely to be protected by tenure,
collective bargaining agreements or employment contracts—schools
have “comprehensive authority . . . to prescribe and control conduct
in the schools.”96 The fact of schools’ ability to discipline their students

94.

Id. at 1306. (“[A] recipient of federal funds should not be able to construct a
grievance procedure so as to shield itself from Title IX liability.”).

95.

See, e.g., Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 243 (4th Cir. 2001) (Michael,
J., dissenting) (“Because [the principal] was the supervisor of the school and
the official designated to receive complaints about sexual assaults, the school
board should not be able to avoid liability for [his] deliberate indifference to
a known risk of teacher-on-student sexual abuse.”); Yog, 2010 WL 4053706,
at *4 (rejecting contention that “notice to an official who the defendant
school has designated to serve as its ‘compliance manager’ is not also
sufficient to satisfy Title IX’s notice requirements”); Doe, 2009 WL 3768906,
at *8 (holding that “responsibility under the school district’s policy to receive
allegations of sexual abuse” rendered principal an appropriate person); Roe
ex rel. Callahan v. Gustine Unified Sch. Dist., 678 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1030
(E.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Doe, 2009 WL 3768906, at *9 (holding that
“responsibility under the school district’s policy to receive allegations of
sexual abuse” rendered principal an appropriate person)). But see Douglas
v. Brookville Area Sch. Dist., 836 F. Supp. 2d 329, 360 n.14 (W.D. Pa. 2011)
(finding that such an approach “would cause liability under Title IX to
collapse into something akin to respondeat superior liability”); Ross v. Univ.
of Tulsa, 859 F.3d 1280, 1291–92 (10th Cir. 2017) (holding that policy
requiring employees to “begin the university’s ‘corrective processes’” was
insufficient to render them appropriate persons).

96.

Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 646 (1999) (quoting Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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“during school hours and on school grounds” 97 is generally
unobjectionable, and it appears to have greatly simplified the Court’s
analysis of whether to award money damages against recipients of Title
IX funding when the U.S. Supreme Court first took up the question of
peer harassment in Davis.
To provide more useful guidance to that effect, the Court should
clarify what it means by corrective action and why virtually any school
employee can be presumed to have authority to implement it in cases
of peer harassment.
A. What Is Corrective Action?

Courts recognize that determining whether an official is an
“appropriate person” is “necessarily a fact-based inquiry.”98 Because the
same job title may carry different job responsibilities from one school
to the next, courts have consistently refused to “name job titles that
would or would not adequately satisfy this requirement.”99 But before
answering whether an individual has the authority to take corrective
action, one must know what “corrective action” actually means. The
term could refer merely to actions taken to punish harassment, or it
could refer to efforts to ensure the victim can enjoy the benefits of an
education de-spite the harassment.
1. Corrective Action Means More Than Swift and Severe Punishment

Some courts have taken the narrow approach, asking only whether
an official has the authority to punish the harasser.100 But others have
taken a more holistic approach, finding that corrective action can also
be focused on victims.101 The latter approach is more consistent with
97.

Id.

98.

Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 186 F.3d 1238, 1247 (10th Cir.
1999).

99.

Id.

100. Baynard, 268 F.3d at 239 (holding an appropriate person must have
“independent authority to suspend, reassign, or terminate” an offending
employee); Blue v. D.C., 850 F. Supp. 2d 16, 34 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d, 811
F.3d 14 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“‘[A]uthority to take corrective action’ means the
ability to fire or discipline the teacher in question.”).
101. See Waters v. Drake, 222 F. Supp. 3d 582, 595 (S.D. Ohio 2016), appeal
dismissed, No. 16-4043, 2016 WL 9665545 (6th Cir. Dec. 27, 2016) (“The
corrective action included strengthening the Band’s leadership, updating the
Band’s policies and procedures to ensure Title IX compliance, training Band
staff on Title IX issues, providing counseling for victims of sexual
harassment, distributing written materials on sexual harassment and sexual
violence to Band staff and members, and conducting assessments of the
effectiveness of efforts to change the Band’s culture.”); J.K. v. Ariz. Bd. of
Regents, No. CV06-916-PHX-MHM, 2008 WL 4446712, at *13 (D. Ariz.
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Department of Education guidance, which explicitly calls for steps beyond disciplining the offending party to “eliminate the hostile
environment, prevent its recurrence, and, as appropriate, remedy its
effects.”102
The Court has signaled the importance of these regulations in
determining the scope of liability under Title IX, pointing specifically
to 34 C.F.R. § 106.3, the Department of Education’s regulation
requiring schools to identify past and present discriminatory practices
and implement remedial measures to eliminate their discriminatory
effects. 103 That mandate stands in stark contrast with the Tenth
Circuit’s rationale in Ross, which appears to be focused almost
exclusively on punitive measures.104 But the Supreme Court has rejected
an approach that insists on “expulsion of every student accused of
misconduct involving sexual overtones” or that makes “particular
remedial demands.”105
Instead, administrators are only required to respond to complaints
“in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable.”106 In Gebser, for instance, the Court took no exception when a principal who received reports of a teacher’s off-color jokes merely cautioned the teacher “to be
careful about his classroom comments.”107 And in Davis, it signaled that
the school may have responded adequately to complaints of sexual
harassment by merely threatening to discipline the offender.108
So understood, the universe of school employees with the power to
take corrective action becomes far larger than the Tenth Circuit acknowledges. If, as was the case in Ross, the school concludes that no
offense or only a de minimis offense had been committed, it would of
course have been within the power of campus police to administer a
Sept. 30, 2008) (mentioning that the corrective action included a
“report . . . to Judicial Affairs for possible Code of Conduct violations.”).
102. Dept. of Ed., Office of Civil Rights, Questions and Answers on
Title IX and Sexual Violence 2–3, https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/
list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf [perma.cc/NLJ7-HHX7].
103. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 288 (1998) (“In the
event of a violation, a funding recipient may be required to take ‘such
remedial action as [is] deem[ed] necessary to overcome the effects of [the]
discrimination.’”) (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(a) (2017)).
104. See supra notes 1–18 and accompanying text.
105. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999).
106. Id. at 649.
107. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 278.
108. Davis, 526 U.S. at 649 (“[I]t remains to be seen whether petitioner can show
that the Board’s response to reports of G.F.’s misconduct was clearly
unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.”).
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verbal warning to the accused rapist or to counsel him on the potential
for more serious consequences that could come from failing to secure
affirmative consent before having sex.
2. Corrective Action Includes Remedial Measures to Benefit the Victim

More importantly, the Tenth Circuit’s narrow definition of
corrective action appears to come from a misconception of the action
to be corrected. In a criminal context, a student reporting sexual assault
is seeking to have the assault punished, so the punishment is an
appropriate way to evaluate the response. But Title IX does not, strictly
speaking, provide a remedy for people who have been harassed or
assaulted; more precisely, it provides a remedy for people who, based
on their sex, have been excluded from participating in an educational
program, who have been denied its benefits, or who have been subjected
to discrimination.109
“Corrective action,” therefore, hardly needs to be limited to
disciplinary action targeting the offender; instead, it may be more
appropriately focused on the victim. If the school can take action to
ensure that a victim continues to enjoy the full benefits of her
education, de-spite having been harassed or assaulted, any action it
takes to that end would constitute corrective action. Properly refocused
on this question, courts should have little difficulty finding that any
given school employee has the power to take corrective action that is
“not clearly un-reasonable.” 110 Depending on the severity of the
incident, it may be enough for a school to take corrective action by
talking to the victim, by referring her to counselors or police, by
notifying her of her rights under Title IX, or by personally requesting
that the Title IX office initiate a formal investigation. Even in more
severe cases, similar re-medial measures directed at the perpetrator—
referring him to counseling or for some other intervention, for
instance—may also be adequate. If any of these were reasonably
calculated to ensure that the incident did not derail the victim’s
education or the education of any future victim, they could be enough
to survive a court’s scrutiny.
Title IX certainly does not suggest that offenders should not be
punished for creating a hostile environment, but its implementation has
consistently focused more heavily on taking actions on behalf of the
109. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2016). The Supreme Court has already recognized an
analogous principle in the Title VII context. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (“[N]ot all workplace conduct that may be
described as ‘harassment’ affects a ‘term, condition, or privilege’ of
employment within the meaning of Title VII. . . . For sexual harassment
to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive . . . .”) (citing
Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (1972)).
110. Davis, 526 U.S. at 649.
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students whom that environment has denied the benefit of their
education. Guidance from the Department of Education’s Office of Civil
Rights (“OCR”) breaks this requirement into three separate categories:
First, to “eliminate any hostile environment that has been created,”
OCR recommends requiring the harasser to apologize to the harassed
student, assisting the harassed student in making schedule changes to
avoid a hostile environment, and communicating to students that such
harassment will not be tolerated.111 Second, to “address the effects of
the harassment,” it suggests providing tutoring, tuition adjustments, or
professional counseling.112 Finally, to “prevent any further harassment,”
the guidance recommends ensuring that the harassed student understands how to report further problems, counseling her to ensure she
understands the full scope of prohibited conduct, checking in to see if
any more harassment has occurred, and providing similar services to
other students to ensure that the problem is not more widespread.113
B. The Collegiate Athletic Coach: A Case Study

To illustrate the breadth of school employees’ authority to
implement OCR-prescribed corrective measures, consider the example
of an athletic coach at a large state school. Colleges have considerably
less authority over their students than they would if they were charged
with educating small children. 114 And governed as they are by
constitutional restraints, state schools have even less authority than
their private counterparts.115 Despite these limitations, even a stateschool coach who learned that one of her athletes was being sexually
harassed or had been sexually assaulted would continue to wield
considerable authority to implement corrective measures on all three
dimensions in the OCR guidance discussed above.

111. Office of Civil Rights, Dep’t of Educ., Revised Sexual
Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School
Employees, Other Student, or Third Parties 16 (2001).
112. Id. at 16–17.
113. Id. at 17.
114. Davis, 526 U.S. at 646 (“[T]he nature of [the State’s] power [over public
schoolchildren] is custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision
and control that could not be exercised over free adults.”) (quoting Vernonia
Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995)).
115. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981) (“[Having] created a forum
generally open for use by student groups . . . the University has assumed
an obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions under applicable
constitutional norms.”).
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1. Courts Generally Accept Coaches as Appropriate Persons in PeerHarassment Cases

There is no reason to think that a coach cannot be an appropriate
person simply because she was not the president of the university or
the full-time Title IX coordinator, as some cases have seemed to
demand. Consistent with the general reluctance to attach appropriateperson status to any given job title, courts have not made any definitive
pronouncements that coaches are or are not appropriate persons,
though several cases have examined the question.
In Kinsman v. Florida State University Board of Trustees, 116 a
student alleged a Title IX violation after a football player raped her
and the school failed to investigate.117 The trial court denied a motion
to dismiss, holding that because determining who is an appropriate person is “a fact-based inquiry,” it could not hold as a matter of law that
neither a football coach nor an associate athletic director was an
appropriate person.118 It recognized that the facts may “show that one
or both of these officials had enough authority over a member of the
foot-ball team to take corrective action.”119
In Roe ex rel. Callahan v. Gustine Unified School District, 120 a
football player alleged a Title IX violation based on sexual harassment
he endured at a football camp.121 The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that it could not conclude
as a matter of law that the football coach was not an appropriate person.122 The court pointed to several facts indicating that the coach had
sufficiently substantial control, noting that he had formulated all
aspects of the football camp and football program, was chief
administrator and disciplinary authority for the football program, had
acted as administrative proxy between the program and the school
district, had determined eligibility criteria, was responsible for athletes
“on and off the field,” and was considered “school personnel in charge”
to whom inappropriate behavior should be reported.123

116. No. 4:15CV235-MW/CAS, 2015 WL 11110848 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2015).
117. Id. at *2.
118. Id. (quoting Doe v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty., Fla., 604 F.3d 1248, 1256
(11th Cir. 2010)).
119. Id.
120. 678 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
121. Id. at 1011.
122. Id. at 1033–34.
123. Id. at 1034.
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In Doe ex rel. Conner v. Unified School District 233,124 a student
alleged a Title IX violation based on harassment from fellow students.125
Although the court granted summary judgment for the defendants, its
analysis concluded that the plaintiff had notified an appropriate person
when he talked to a teacher and track coach.126 Relying on a previously
established presumption that teachers have authority to take corrective
action against peer-to-peer harassment during the school day on school
grounds, the court noted that Doe had complained to a track coach at
track practice on school grounds—“similar enough for the court to
presume [the coach] had the requisite control to take corrective
measures.”127
S.S. v. Alexander128 appears to have come the closest to directly
answering the question. There, an assistant equipment manager for the
University of Washington football team brought a Title IX complaint
after being raped by a football player and watching her complaints go
unaddressed by a series of school employees of escalating authority.129
The Washington Court of Appeals held that the equipment manager
and an assistant football coach were not appropriate persons because
their “duties are at a lower level, more akin to a classroom instructor.”130
But it held that an assistant athletic director and associate athletic
director were appropriate persons because each “holds an
administrative position involving the exercise of significant discretion
and each plainly had the authority to ‘institute corrective measures’”131
and was “in a position to exercise control over the harasser and the
context in which the harassment took place.”132 The head coach was
apparently never notified, so there was no holding on whether he would
have qualified.133
Some courts have rejected coaches as appropriate persons, but those
instances appear to be limited to cases of harassment by employees. In
Najera v. Independent School District of Stroud No. I-54 of Lincoln
124. No. 12-2285-JTM, 2013 WL 3984336 (D. Kan. Aug. 1, 2013).
125. Id. at *1, *3.
126. Id. at *5, *8.
127. Id. at *5.
128. 177 P.3d 724 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
129. Id. at 728.
130. Id. at 738.
131. Id. (quoting Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277
(1998)).
132. Id. (citing Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 645 (1999)).
133. Id. at 729.
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County,134 a parent alleged a Title IX violation based on her daughter’s
interactions with a school employee whose husband and father—both
teachers and coaches for the school district themselves—were aware of
the relationship.135 The court granted summary judgment for the school
for any harassment that occurred while they were the only ones who
knew of it, saying that there was no evidence that either of them had
any authority to take corrective action.136
And in Doe No. 1 v. Boulder Valley School District No. Re-2,137 a
group of high school students alleged Title IX violations based on sexual
harassment by a wrestling coach.138 The court granted a motion to dismiss, holding that no appropriate person was aware of the
harassment.139 The case presented a strange fact pattern in which the
harasser, Travis Masse, was initially a volunteer assistant coach for the
Boulder Valley School District while working on his education degree
and doing a field placement in another school district.140 That district
informed Mark Schmidt, Boulder Valley’s head wrestling coach, that
Masse had been harassing girls, but Schmidt retained Masse.141 After
Masse landed a full-time teaching job with Boulder Valley, he and
Schmidt swapped positions in the wrestling program, with Masse becoming head coach and Schmidt becoming an assistant.142 While the
court seemed to allow for the possibility that a wrestling coach could
be an appropriate person, it said that Schmidt was not because Masse’s
harassment of the plaintiffs in this case came after Masse’s promotion.143
Given his position as a subordinate, the court said, “[t]here is no
plausible allegation that he had any authority to address the alleged
dis-crimination and take corrective action.”144
The general consensus that a coach may be an appropriate person
in the context of peer-harassment cases is only reinforced by the
Supreme Court’s observations on the special significance of coaches in
134. No. CIV-14-657-R, 2015 WL 4310552 (W.D. Okla. July 14, 2015).
135. Id. at *1.
136. Id. at *2.
137. No. 11-CV-02107-PAB-KLM, 2012 WL 4378162 (D. Colo. Sept. 25, 2012),
aff’d, 523 F. App’x 514 (10th Cir. 2013).
138. Id. at *1–2.
139. Id. at *5.
140. Id. at *1.
141. Id.
142. Id. at *1–2.
143. Id. at *4 n.2.
144. Id.
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the context of addressing Title IX violations, saying they “are often in
the best position to vindicate the rights of their students because they
are better able to identify discrimination and bring it to the attention
of administrators.”145 Kent State University also seems to acknowledge
the importance of coaches in addressing student-athletes’ grievances, as
its literature discourages students from reporting problems to the media
and instructs them instead that “the coaches’ office is the only place”
to take their complaints.146
2. Coaches Employed by Schools Are Explicitly Empowered to Take
Corrective Action

Despite the few cases expressing skepticism, the courts have—with
good reason—generally been at least open to the idea that a coach can
be an appropriate person. The occasional hesitation seems to be due to
concerns about their disciplinary authority, but as Section IV.A
discussed, that is only the smallest concern when evaluating their
authority to implement corrective action. To illustrate the breadth of
options available, this case study draws from authorities applicable to
a single employee of a single institution—in this case, Kent State
University.
A variety of authorities would explicitly empower—and in some
cases obligate—that coach to take meaningful action in response to a
credible report of sexual harassment or assault. Under federal law, state
law, and university policy, the coach would have the authority to help
eliminate the hostile environment by:
•

Reporting the
investigation;147

rape

to

police

for

a

criminal

145. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 181 (2005).
146. Kent State Univ., Student-Athlete Handbook 83 (2014), https://
www.kentstatesports.com/documents/2015/2/16//REV_SA_HANDBOO
K_ALL_14_15.pdf?id=4222 [perma.cc/5WTG-WHXP] (emphasis added).
147. Kent State Univ., Policy Register, ch. 5-16.2(D)(3) (“[U]niversity
employees . . . are required to report to the appropriate law enforcement
agency information brought to their attention concerning [felony crimes].”);
Kent State Univ., Sexual and Relationship Violence Support
Services, Your Role as Responsible Employee: Reporting Sex
Discrimination, Sexual Harassment and Sexual Misconduct
[hereinafter Role as Responsible Employee], https://www.kent.edu/
rvss/your-role-responsible-employee [perma.cc/HP5M-56WH] (last visited
Feb. 25, 2018) (“All Kent State University employees are REQUIRED to
report any instance of sexual harassment or misconduct to the Title IX
Coordinator or a Deputy Coordinator, and in the case of sexual assault, to
the police.”).
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•

Notifying the victim that she may report the rape to
police;148

•

Assisting the victim in reporting the rape to police;149

•

Notifying the victim that she may be able to obtain a
civil order protecting her from her harasser;150

•

Reporting the rape to the university’s Title IX
coordinator for an internal investigation;151

•

Notifying the victim that she could pursue disciplinary
charges against her harasser;152 and

•

Notifying the victim how to pursue these options while
protecting her confidentiality.153

Because none of these corrective measures would violate anyone else’s
rights, any person, including the coach, would have the authority to
implement them.
The coach could also take action to address the effects of the
harassment by:
•

Referring the victim to counseling;154

•

Referring the victim for mental health services;155

•

Referring the victim for victim-advocacy services;156

•

Referring the victim for legal assistance;157

148. 20 U.S.C. § 1092 (f)(8)(B)(ii–iii) (2017) (requiring rape victims to be notified
of rights and university policies concerning sexual assault).
149. Id.
150. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(8)(B)(iii)(IV) (2012).
151. Ohio Admin. Code 3342-5-16.2(D) (“All employees of the university are
required to report all instances of gender/sexual harassment, sexual
misconduct, stalking, and intimate partner violence to the Title IX
coordinator . . . .”); Role as Responsible Employee, supra note 147.
152. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(8)(B)(iv) (2012).
153. Id. § 1092(f)(8)(B)(v).
154. Id. § 1092(f)(8)(B)(vi).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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•

Notifying the victim about the availability of assistance
in changing her academic, living, transportation, and
working arrangements;158

•

Referring the victim to another university official more
familiar with the resources available to the victim;159 and

•

Rescheduling the victim’s practices to accommodate her
efforts to avail herself of the above services.160

As with the corrective measures aimed at eliminating the hostile
environment, the coach would need no special authority to take any of
these actions.
OCR also provides guidance on how to handle the offending party
when sexual harassment occurs, calling for “reasonable, timely, ageappropriate, and effective corrective action.” 161 It suggests that the
person receiving the complaint: “counsel, warn, or take disciplinary
action against the harasser”; 162 take steps to “separate the harassed
student and the harasser”;163 and direct the harasser “to have no further
contact with the harassed student.”164
Once the coach’s attention turns away from offering the victim
assistance and toward punishment for the offender, her authority is
necessarily diminished in deference to a student’s recognized property
interests in his education.165
3. Students Are Obligated to Comply with a Coach’s Directives

Still, as long as the coach ensured that her response was
proportional to the reported misconduct and within the constraints of
due process, she would enjoy substantial authority to pursue any of the
158. Id. § 1092(f)(8)(B)(vii).
159. See Ohio Admin. Code 3342-5-16.2(D) (2018).
160. Ohio Admin. Code 3342-4-02.4(D)(1) (granting coaches authority to set
rules for student-athlete training).
161. Office of Civil Rights, Dept. of Educ., Revised Sexual
Harassment Guidance 16 (2001), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/
list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5H2-P9N2].
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975) (“Neither the property interest in
educational benefits temporarily denied nor the liberty interest in reputation,
which is also implicated, is so insubstantial that suspensions may
constitutionally be imposed by any procedure the school chooses, no matter
how arbitrary.”).
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above options, and the offender would be obligated to comply.
University-wide policies confer broad authority on university employees
to make reasonable requests to maintain an environment conducive to
education, and they subject students to disciplinary sanctions for failing
to comply with those requests.166 And if a sexual assault occurred in a
residence hall, that conduct would also be governed by Kent State’s
“Hallways Handbook,” a separate set of rules imposing an independent
obligation on students to “comply with reasonable requests made by
university officials.”167
Assuming that the coach is a faculty member, as is normally the
case, she would also enjoy the substantial disciplinary authority
inherent in that role. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the
general authority of school officials to control the behavior of their
students.168 In the context of higher education, Ohio courts have held
that that power is especially strong among faculty members. 169 For
more than 100 years, they have said that matters of discipline at
universities “have been left largely, if not entirely, to the faculty, and
their action in such matters is binding upon the institution they
represent.” 170 That approach has been roughly codified in a statute
166. Kent State Univ., Code of Student Conduct 2, 13 (2014),
https://web.archive.org/web/20150423043957/http://www.kent.edu:80/
studentconduct/code-student-conduct [https://perma.cc/2Z9C-NYM4].
167. Kent State Univ., Hallways Handbook 3.1 (2017), http://www.kent.
edu/housing/hh-3-residence-hall-policies [perma.cc/5B5V-4YN7].
168. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969)
(recognizing school officials’ “comprehensive authority . . . to prescribe and
control conduct in the schools”); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341
(1985) (Powell, J., concurring) (relaxing warrant requirements out of
deference to “substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to
maintain order in the schools”); Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S.
629, 646 (1999) (acknowledging school officials’ “substantial control” over
students’ conduct).
169. Several courts have acknowledged the importance of these types of statespecific considerations in determining whether someone is an appropriate
person. See Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 239 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding
that principal was not an appropriate person because state law required
superintendent’s permission to reassign an offending teacher); Hawkins v.
Sarasota Cty. Sch. Bd., 322 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that
an appropriate-person determination would require an inquiry into “the
authority and responsibility granted by state law to administrators and
teachers”); Annamaria M v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., No. C 03-0101
VRW, 2006 WL 1525733, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 30, 2006) (acknowledging
that state law determines who “exercises substantial control for the purposes
of Title IX liability”).
170. Koblitz v. W. Reserve Univ., 1901 WL 689, at *8 (Ohio Cir. Ct. Jan. 21,
1901).
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recognizing the broad authority of faculty “to take appropriate
disciplinary action, through such procedures as may be provided by
rule, regulation, or custom of such college or university . . . .”171
Given the power to institute almost any of the OCR-suggested
disciplinary corrective actions, an athletic coach easily meets the Davis
standard and likely the higher bar set in Gebser. Because most of the
authorities cited above are standard provisions across schools and
across jurisdictions, and because they are typically not limited to
coaches, a similar—and often expanded—portfolio of corrective
authority is available to virtually any school employee who learns of
harassment.
C. Ross Is Wrong

Given the established precedent recognizing the broad authority of
coaches and schools in general to regulate their students’ conduct, the
abundance of formal guidance on appropriate corrective measures, and
the purposes underlying Title IX, there is little left to justify the holding
in Ross, which took an exceptionally narrow approach to defining
“corrective measures.” 172 In so doing, the court afforded the school
virtually no discretion to consider and impose the most suitable
punishment under the circumstances.
There was no suggestion in Davis that the Court expected lower
courts to import its appropriate-person test for teacher-on-student
harassment cases from Gebser into peer-harassment cases. The Court
did not apply the test itself or say that the test should be the same as
in Gebser; instead, it explicitly announced a different test, finding
liability in cases “where the recipient is deliberately indifferent to
known acts of student-on-student sexual harassment and the harasser
is under the school’s disciplinary authority.”173 Ross makes clear that
the Court needs to be more explicit still. Its holding—that Title IX
offers no relief to a victim of peer harassment because campus security
officers lack “authority to take corrective action” to address a rape on
their campus174—is consistent with neither the test set out in Davis nor
with common sense.
In justifying its decision in Ross, the Tenth Circuit professed a
certain degree of ignorance about how a police force works, finding that
the plaintiff had failed to proffer sufficient facts to create a substantial
question of material fact on points that most people would probably

171. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3345.24(A) (West 2017).
172. Ross v. Univ. of Tulsa, 859 F.3d 1280, 1289–92 (10th Cir. 2017).
173. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 646–47 (1999).
174. Ross, 859 F.3d at 1284.
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consider too obvious to mention. 175 This conceit was aided by the
court’s recharacterization of the “Tulsa University Campus Police”—as
it was consistently labeled in the District Court’s decision—to merely
“campus security.” 176 So downgraded, the agency’s powers were
suddenly open enough to interpretation that the court found it unclear
exactly how “officers combat campus violence,”177 whether investigating
a rape report would constitute corrective action, 178 and whether
arresting a rapist would constitute corrective action.179
It seems unlikely that many people would struggle with these
questions or require detailed factual showings before conceding that
when sexual harassment takes the form of rape, sworn police officers
and even civilian security personnel would generally have the “authority
to end the harassment.”180 Part of the problem appears to come from
the exceedingly narrow conception of Gebser’s demand for notice to an
official with “authority to address the alleged discrimination and to
institute corrective measures on the recipient’s behalf.” 181 The Ross
court never defined what would actually constitute a corrective
measure, but the only thing that it seemed to accept was action by the
university’s dean of students, who presumably had authority to mete
out punishments to students.182
As Part IV explained, Davis rejects any attempt by either plaintiffs
or reviewing courts to select and impose their own preferred corrective
measures, whether punitive or remedial. Instead, they are bound to consider the measures actually taken by the school and evaluate whether
they were clearly unreasonable—and in so doing, they are obligated to
extend the school a healthy dose of deference to those decisions.183

175. Id. at 1288–89.
176. Id. The court went so far as bracketing out Ross’s reference to “CAMPO,”
the school’s vernacular for “campus police,” and replacing it with “campus
security.” Compare Ross, 859 F.3d at 1291 with Appellant’s Reply Brief at
12, Ross v. Univ. of Tulsa, 859 F.3d 1280 (10th Cir. 2017) (No. 01019732904).
177. Ross, 859 F.3d at 1290 n.7.
178. Id. at 1291 (“Perhaps investigation is a form of corrective action; perhaps
not.”).
179. Id. at 1292 n. 9.
180. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 283 (1998).
181. Id. at 290.
182. Ross, 859 F.3d at 1290.
183. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999) (“[C]ourts
should refrain from second-guessing the disciplinary decisions made by school
administrators.”).
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V. Resolutions
Given these deficiencies in Ross, the Court should grant certiorari
and take the opportunity to clarify the test it laid out in Davis. Most
easily, the Court could explicitly differentiate the two tests and
continue to apply different tests in teacher-student and peerharassment cases. It may, however, be easier to simply recharacterize
Gebser as the generally applicable test for Title IX harassment cases
while characterizing Davis as establishing a presumption that in peerharassment cases, almost any employee will have the authority
necessary to be considered an appropriate person.
The latter approach may be more sensible, as it would provide lower
courts with a single test with broader applicability, streamline the
analysis for a large share of the cases to which it is applicable, and
retain sufficient flexibility to address the rare case in which a party
with knowledge of peer harassment truly lacks the capacity to do
anything.
Moreover, this approach would shift the burden of proof to the
party with greater access to relevant information. Operating in a
framework where proof that the recipient of a report had authority to
launch a rape investigation and arrest the perpetrator may not be
enough to satisfy a court of appeals, plaintiffs will be required to engage
in even more extensive and detailed discovery on the precise contours
of the recipients’ authority, all the potential sources of that authority,
its record of exercising that authority, and its record of exceeding that
authority. Rather than imposing those costs on both parties, a simple
presumption of authority would allow trial courts to accept as true an
assertion that the Supreme Court has already acknowledged is generally
accepted as a matter of fact and law, while permitting defendants to
contest the issue in the rare cases where there is actually some basis to
do so.

Conclusion
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Ross is fatally flawed. It is not
consistent with the landmark precedents on which it is based, nor is it
consistent with the subsequent decisions reached by almost all of its
sister circuits. These discrepancies provide sufficient grounds alone for
the Court to review and reverse the case; more problematic are the
implications of this decision on the innumerable students who are
experiencing exactly the kind of discrimination that Title IX is meant
to address but are nonetheless unable to find relief because their
universities have failed to implement adequate procedures to encourage
those students to report and reassure them that those reports will be
taken seriously.
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No One Is an Inappropriate Person

Contrary to Ross’s narrow conceptions of corrective action and
school officials’ power to implement it, virtually any employee—and
especially a campus police officer—has more than enough authority to
take meaningful steps to mitigate the effects of sex-based discrimination
on students’ educational experience. The Court should reverse that
decision, clarify that this kind of analysis is too superfluous to be
demanded, and provide schools an incentive to better protect their
students from sexual harassment and assault.
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